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COMMENTS
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
PROBATIONERS: WHAT REMAINS AFTER
WAIVING THEIR RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES?
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1991, Tyrell was placed on probation as the re-
sult of a criminal conviction. As a condition of probation,
Tyrell consented to submit to a search of his person and prop-
erty, at any time with or without a warrant, by any law en-
forcement officer, probation officer or school official.
Five months later, Tyrell and two of his friends attended
a football game. Tyrell carried marijuana and one of his
friends carried a long fixed blade knife. Police officers at-
tended the game because the previous week there had been a
gang fight where a shooting had occurred. Tyrell and his
friends drew the attention of the officers because they were
wearing heavy clothes in weather that exceeded eighty de-
grees. Upon learning that Tyrell and his friends were mem-
bers of the gang involved in the shooting the previous week,
the officers stopped and searched individuals in the group.
They discovered the blade on Tyrell's friend and found the
marijuana on Tyrell.
These facts are similar to those recently considered by
the California Supreme Court in In re Tyrell J. 1 In Tyrell J.,
the court considered whether the search violated the Fourth
Amendment due to the fact that the searching officer had no
knowledge of Tyrell's probation condition.2 It held that the
search of Tyrell was constitutional due to Tyrell's probation
1. 876 P.2d 519, 521 (Cal. 1994). The only material distinction is that in
Tyrell J., the defendant was a minor. Id. In California, adult probationers have
the option of rejecting the option of probation, whereas juveniles do not. Id. at
527.
2. Id. at 521.
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condition. 3 In analyzing this issue, this comment also con-
cludes that such searches are constitutional. In reaching this
conclusion, the comment first considers the extent to which
probationers may consent to waive their Fourth Amendment
rights as a condition of probation. Second, this comment ex-
amines the relevance of the searching officer's knowledge of
such consent.
Currently, conflicting authority exists at both the state
and federal levels as to whether probationers may completely
waive their Fourth Amendment Rights. Relying on the
United States Supreme Court decision of Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin,4 the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
have found that all searches of probationers must be sup-
ported by, at least, a showing of reasonable cause.5 Reaching
the opposite conclusion, the California Supreme Court has
held that the search of a probationer is only limited by the
scope of a probationer's "search condition."6
Only California has addressed the second issue, the rele-
vance of a searching officer's knowledge of a probationer's
search condition. In Tyrell J., the California Supreme Court
held that a searching officer's knowledge was irrelevant and
instead focused on the validity of the probationer's search
condition.v Several California Courts of Appeal have reached
the same conclusion. 8
This comment begins with a brief summary of the Fourth
Amendment. 9 This section focuses on the aspects which ap-
ply to probationers who have consented to waive their Fourth
3. Id.
4. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
5. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1990).
6. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 339-40 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
904 (1988). A "search condition" is a condition of probation where a defendant
agrees to submit to searches which would otherwise be prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. In California, adult probationers must consent to search condi-
tions in order to receive probation. See, e.g., id. at 341. Therefore, the language
of the search condition equivocates the scope of the probationer's consent.
7. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521 (Cal. 1994).
8. See In re Bihn L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 679 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
a police officer need not know of a probationer's search condition for the search
to be valid); In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 902 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that a probationer's search condition left him with no expectation of privacy
even though the searching officer had no knowledge of the probationer's search
condition).
9. See infra part II.A.
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Amendment rights. It explains the "expectation of privacy"
test, and proceeds to give a brief overview of the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. 10
The consent and special needs exceptions to the warrant and
probable cause requirements are then discussed.
The comment next addresses how the Fourth Amend-
ment applies specifically to probationers." As an introduc-
tion, the purposes and policy considerations underlying pro-
bation are discussed. 12 Next, the comment explores limits on
the imposition of probation conditions. 13 In particular, this
section focuses on court decisions which have considered
whether probationers should be able to consent to waive their
Fourth Amendment rights.'4
Part VI proceeds to analyze the issues presented by
Tyrell J.' 5 In this section, this comment contends that proba-
tion searches should not be limited to reasonable cause when
a search condition provides otherwise.1 6 In addition, it as-
serts that a searching officer's knowledge should be irrele-
vant to determine the validity of a search when a probationer
has previously agreed to waive his Fourth Amendment
rights. 7 Finally, Part V of the comment concludes by offering
recommendations for courts to consider in resolving these
issues.18
10. See infra part II.A.
11. See infra part II.B.
12. See infra part II.B.
13. See infra part II.B.
14. See infra part II.B.
15. See infra part IV.
16. See infra part V.A.
17. See infra part IV.B.
18. See infra part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
a. Searches
The Fourth Amendment 19 controls all searches con-
ducted by governmental agents.20 A search is an invasion of
a constitutionally protected area. 21  Historically, the
Supreme Court held that the only constitutionally protected
areas were those enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.22
However, that interpretation changed in 1967 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States.23 In Katz,
the Court found that the Fourth Amendment protects people
and not places.24 Therefore, the Court held that the focus of
any Fourth Amendment inquiry should be on a person's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy and not on the particular area
where one is located. 2
5
The Supreme Court has since relied on the two-part test
set forth in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz to determine
the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.26 First,
the individual must have exhibited an actual, subjective ex-
19. The Fourth Amendment provides:
[Tihe right of the people to be secure in the persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants Shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment applies to state officials
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 33 (1949).
States may afford greater protection than those provided for in the Federal
Constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76(1980).
As a result, a search or seizure considered valid under the United States Con-
stitution may still violate a state constitution.
20. The Fourth Amendment applies only to searches and seizures which are
the product of government action. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467
(1921) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was "intended as a restraint upon
the activities of the sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies.").
21. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (interpreting
"houses" to include hotel rooms).
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
24. Id. at 351.
25. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
pectation of privacy.2 7 Second, society must recognize that
expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable. 28 For exam-
ple, Justice Harlan indicated that the home is a place where
privacy is reasonably expected. 29 However, he indicated that
items which are in the public's "plain view" may not be pro-
tected because exposition to the public indicates a lack of an
expectation of privacy.30 In addition, the Supreme Court has
since ruled that the defendant has the burden of establishing
under the totality of the circumstances, that the search vio-
lated her expectation of privacy in a particular place.3 '
b. Seizures
The Fourth Amendment also protects against all unrea-
sonable seizures conducted by governmental agents.32 A
seizure of a person occurs when that person believes she is
not free to leave an encounter with an agent of the govern-
ment.33 Not every encounter with a police officer or other
government official is considered a seizure. A person has
been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free
to leave.34 The Supreme Court expanded this rule in Florida
v. Bostick, 5 holding that the test for a seizure is an objective
one which "presupposes an innocent person"36 and does not
vary with the particular state of mind of the individual.
3 7
27. Id.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id.
30. Id. See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (finding no
legitimate expectation of privacy for marijuana plants growing in backyard to
planes flying overhead); United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 957-58 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding that the Fourth Amendment does not protect abandoned suitcase
where owner indicated to police that it was not hers).
31. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
34. Id.
35. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
36. Id. at 2388.
37. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988)). The
Court was responding to the defendant's argument that no reasonable person
would freely consent to a search of luggage which contained illegal drugs. Id.
The defendant was a passenger on a bus who had been approached by two po-
lice officers who asked him if they could search his luggage. Id. at 2384-85.
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2. Probable Cause
Probable cause is the degree of knowledge necessary to
justify an intrusion under Fourth Amendment protection.
This standard is enumerated in the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment. 38 The probable cause analysis must be
conducted on a case by case basis.39 It cannot be reduced to a
neat set of legal rules, but must be determined by the totality
of the circumstances surrounding each particular search or
seizure. 40 As a general rule, information establishing prob-
able cause must amount to more than mere suspicion.4 '
There must be objective, articulable facts that would lead a
prudent person to believe that contraband would be found in
a particular location.4 2
3. The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment requires that: "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
Affirmation .... ,4 In Katz v. United States,44 the Court held
that searches conducted without a warrant were "per se un-
reasonable ... [and] subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions. In addition, the
Supreme Court has found that a "neutral and detached mag-
istrate" must determine whether the police have established
probable cause for a search.46  Those seeking a search war-
rant must provide a magistrate with the specific facts neces-
sary to allow him to independently determine whether suffi-
38. See supra note 19 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
39. illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
40. Id. at 238.
41. Id.
42. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
44. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
45. Id. at 357; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971)
(plurality opinion).
46. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). A magistrate is pre-
ferred over law enforcement officials because law enforcement officials "may
lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence sup-
porting the contemplated action against the individual's interests in protecting
his own liberty." Id. In Coolidge, the Court ruled that a state attorney general,
acting as a justice of the peace, could not issue a warrant as a neutral magis-
trate. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 453. The Court found that "there could hardly be a
more appropriate setting than this for a per se rule of disqualification rather
than a case-by-case evaluation of all of the circumstances." Id. at 450.
[Vol. 351242
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cient probable cause exists.4 v Great deference should be
given to the magistrate's decision on appeal.48
4. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The requirement that a search or seizure be conducted
pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause is riddled
with exceptions. These exceptions include investigative de-
tentions,49 searches incident to arrest,50 seizure of items in
plain view,5 1 consent searches,52 inventory searches, 3 ad-
ministrative searches, 5 4 and searches in which the special
needs of law enforcement make the probable cause require-
ment impractical.5 5 Because this comment focuses on the
Fourth Amendment rights of probationers, only consent
searches and special needs searches are germane. 56 There-
fore, this comment only addresses those exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
a. Consent Searches
A well-settled exception to the warrant requirement in-
volves searches conducted pursuant to consent.5 v Consent is
a voluntary waiver of a person's Fourth Amendment rights.58
47. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
48. Id. at 236.
49. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
50. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981).
51. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
52. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
53. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).
54. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978) (finding the
probable cause requirement less stringent than required for criminal
investigations).
55. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quot-
ing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 108-114.
57. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800
(1947) (per curiam). As discussed below, consent searches are frequently used
to limit probationers' Fourth Amendment rights. See infra part II.B.3. For ex-
ample, in California, defendants are often required to either agree to submit to
be searched by any law enforcement official, at any time, or undergo their sen-
tence in prison. See infra part II.B.3. As a result, probation conditions have
become a very powerful law enforcement tools because after defendants consent
to these conditions, they may be searched by any law enforcement official, for
any reason, whether or not the official has knowledge of the search condition.
In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521 (Cal. 1994).
58. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
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It can be given expressly, impliedly, or pursuant to a prior
agreement.5 9 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,6 ° the Supreme
Court distinguished consent to search from consent to waive
other constitutional protections. 1 It reasoned that the strict
test of a "knowing and intelligent waiver," as set down by
Johnson v. Zerbst,62 did not apply to the waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights. 3 Instead, the Supreme Court held that
consent to search must only be voluntary and not the product
of duress or coercion. 4 The Court clarified its position that
the determination of voluntary consent involves a question of
fact which must be considered in light of all the circum-
stances. 5 When resolving a question of fact, trial courts are
given great deference by reviewing courts.6 Their findings
are not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous.6
Some of the factors the Court considers when determin-
ing whether voluntary consent exists include age, education,
intelligence, knowledge of constitutional rights, length of the
detention, and the level and nature of the questioning.
68
Although each of these factors weighs into the Court's deci-
sion, no single factor is controlling.6 9 Each decision reflects a
careful analysis of the surrounding circumstances.7 °
In addition to being voluntary, any search or seizure
must fall within the scope of the consent. 71 The scope of con-
59. Zap, 328 U.S. at 628.
60. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
61. Id. at 235-46.
62. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
63. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241. The Court stated: "[nlothing, either in the
purposes behind requiring a 'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or
in the practical application of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be
extended to the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id.
64. Id. at 248-49.
65. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
66. See United States v. Twomey, 884 F.2d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding
the trial court's determination not clearly erroneous where officers testified de-
fendant's parents voluntarily consented), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 908 (1990).
67. Id.
68. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
69. Id. As long as the requirements set forth in Schneckloth are met, any-
one may consent to a warrantless search. See United States v. Varona-Algos,
819 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1987) (indicating that the only limit on consent is
coercive tactics by government officials), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987).
70. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
71. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982) (holding that a search
conducted pursuant to a valid consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment
unless the search exceeds the scope of that consent).
sent is determined by what a reasonable person in similar
circumstances would understand to be the limits of the con-
sent given.72 For example, if a defendant consents to a search
of a container in her possession, the police may search any
container within that container without exceeding the scope
of consent.7 3 Only if the defendant expressly limits her con-
sent do such searches exceed the scope of that consent.74 In
addition, normally, the scope of consent is limited by the ob-
ject of the search.75
b. Special Needs Exception
Another exception to the warrant requirement occurs
when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment, make the warrant and probable cause requirements
impractical."" When determining whether a special need ex-
ists, courts consider the extent to which the warrant and
probable cause requirements interfere with the government's
objective. 77 Courts proceed to balance the burden on the gov-
ernment against the degree of intrusion into the individual's
right to privacy. 78 For example, in New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
79
the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless
search of a student's purse, finding that the burden of ob-
taining a warrant unduly interfered with the school's need to
maintain order.80 Likewise, in O'Connor v. Ortega,"1 the
Court justified the warrantless search of an employee's office
72. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (finding that consent to
search a vehicle included implicit authorization to open a paper bag on the floor
board).
73. E.g., United States v. Gutierrez-Mederos, 965 F.2d 800, 803-04 (9th Cir.
1992) (finding that consent to search a vehicle implied consent to search locked
box within the vehicle), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1315 (1993).
74. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. Any container may be searched if it is reason-
able to believe that the container could be concealing the object of that search.
United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 918 (1989).
75. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.
76. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
77. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 325.
81. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
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for work-related purposes. It held that the state had a special
need to maintain an efficient and proper workplace.
8 2
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Griffin v. Wiscon-
sin,83 holding that the state of Wisconsin had demonstrated a
"special need" to dispose of the warrant and probable cause
requirements for its probationers. s4 In that case, the Court
upheld a Wisconsin regulation which allowed "reasonable"
searches of all persons who were placed on probation. 5 The
Court found that the warrant requirement would appreciably
interfere with Wisconsin's probation system because the de-
lay in getting a warrant would make it more difficult to re-
spond to evidence of probation violations.8 6 As a result, the
Court felt it was constitutionally acceptable for Wisconsin, by
administrative regulation, to lower the probable cause stan-
dard for probation searches to that of "reasonable cause."87
As discussed below, Griffin represents the most central
United States Supreme Court decision relevant to the propo-
sal of this comment.8 8
5. The Exclusionary Rule
Courts use the exclusionary rule as the primary tool in
deterring unconstitutional searches conducted by govern-
ment officials.89 It requires the suppression of evidence at
82. Id. at 720.
83. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
84. Id. at 875-76.
85. Id. at 871. Note that Wisconsin imposed this condition of probation
without requiring that the court obtain the probationer's consent. Id.
This is material in that California's probation searches are based on the
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment, whereas probation searches not
based on consent are based on the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75.
86. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
87. Id. Reasonable cause is defined as "[a] basis for arrest without warrant,
is such state of facts as would lead men of ordinary care and prudence to believe
and conscientiously entertain honest and strong suspicion that person sought to
be arrested is guilty of committing a crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1265
(6th ed. 1991).
88. See infra part III. The Griffin decision remains central because the
First and Ninth Circuits have interpreted this decision as requiring knowledge
constituting a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity to support the search
of any probationer, regardless of whether the probationer has previously con-
sented to be searched. See infra text accompanying notes 119-139. In contrast,
California courts impose no such limitation and limit a search to the scope of a
probationer's consent. See infra text accompanying notes 141-152.
89. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The California State Constitu-
tion no longer affords "independent state grounds for excluding relevant evi-
trial obtained through government violations of the Fourth
Amendment. 90 The Supreme Court characterized the rule in
Linkletter v. Walker 9 1 as an "effective deterrent to illegal po-
lice action."92
Since use of the rule often leads to the loss of highly pro-
bative evidence, courts limit its application to situations
where it has the maximum deterrent effect.93 When deter-
mining whether the rule applies, the Court balances the cost
and benefits of using the illegally obtained evidence.94 In the
context of a criminal trial, the Court weighs the deterrent ef-
fect of future Fourth Amendment violations against the pro-
bative value of the evidence sought to be excluded.
95
B. Probationers and the Fourth Amendment
1. Purposes of Probation
Probation serves as a substitute for the incarceration of
convicted criminals. It is defined as "a sentence imposed for
commission of crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is
released into the community under the supervision of a pro-
bation officer in lieu of incarceration."96 Probation has been
favored for offenders of less serious crimes because it repre-
sents a healthy alternative to incarceration. 97 Probation
seeks to maximize the liberty of the offender while still pro-
tecting the public from that individual's future violations of
the law.98 It emphasizes the goal of rehabilitation and is less
dence." United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991). Therefore,
the California constitution requires that relevant evidence be excluded only if
"the federal constitution forbids its use." Id. (citing In re Lance W., 694 P.2d
744 (Cal. 1985)).
90. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
91. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
92. Id. at 636-37.
93. Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 920 (1984) (refusing
to apply the exclusionary rule because of police officers' good faith reliance on a
facially valid search warrant); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446-48 (1984) (re-
fusing to apply the exclusionary rule because evidence would have inevitably
been discovered by a lawful means); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
491 (1963) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule because connection between
illegal act and evidence were so far removed).
94. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
95. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).
96. BLAcKs LAw DICTIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1991) (citing State v. Fields, 686
P.2d 1379, 1387 (Haw. 1984).
97. ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.2 (Approved Draft 1970).
98. Id.
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costly to administer than incarceration. 99 In addition, it
tends to avoid some of the negative effects of confinement.
For instance, it avoids the transition problems ex-convicts
have in assimilating back into society and removes the ad-
verse impact incarceration has on the innocent dependents of
the offender.' 00
Virtually every jurisdiction in this country uses proba-
tion as an alternative to incarceration. Jurisdictions vary,
however, as to the manner in which probation is imposed. In
California, for example, the grant of probation is usually con-
ditioned with the requirement that the offender consent to
adopt certain behavior and waive certain fundamental
rights."' Federal courts, however, generally may impose
probation, and its appurtenant conditions, without the con-
sent of the individual probationer. 10 2 Common conditions of
probation include requirements to obey all laws, refrain from
drug or alcohol use, avoid associating with other convicts, re-
port any change in employment or home address to a proba-
tion officer, and consent to waive Fourth Amendment
rights. 103
2. Limits on Conditions of Probation-Generally
Courts have broad discretion when imposing restrictive
conditions on the grant of probation.10 4 However, since the
purpose of probation seeks to deter probationers from future
criminality, conditions of probation must reasonably relate to
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 6.
102. This distinction is a material one in that this comment turns on the fact
that probationers in California voluntarily consent to waive their Fourth
Amendment rights. See infra part IV. As such, the discussion of federal au-
thority below is relevant only to the extent that the author disagrees with the
First and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals' finding that Griffin v. Wisconsin re-
quires that all probation searches must be supported by reasonable cause. See
infra part IV.
103. Judah Best & Paul I. Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51
GEO. L.J. 809, 817 (1963).
104. See Pierson v. Grant, 527 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir. 1975) (requiring the
appellant to execute a waiver of extradition held valid as a condition of proba-
tion); In re Bushman, 463 P.2d 727, 732-33 (Cal. 1970) (holding that courts have
broad discretion to impose probation conditions which foster rehabilitation and
protect public safety).
1248 [Vol. 35
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the crime which the defendant has been convicted of.'0 ' For
example, in People v. Kay,10 6 the court struck down, in part, a
probation condition which required the defendant to submit
to warrantless searches. 10 7 The court reasoned that the de-
fendant's conviction of assault had nothing to do with a
search, and therefore, invalidated the condition because it did
not reasonably relate to deterring the defendant's future
criminality. 108
3. The Validity of Search Conditions
As discussed above, probation conditions must reason-
ably relate to the defendant's crime in order to be valid. One
of the most common probation conditions involves probation-
ers' consent to submit to warrantless searches. The majority
of jurisdictions have upheld these conditions' 0 9 pursuant to
either the "consent" or "special needs" exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment. °10 In California, adult probationers
may choose to refuse to accept a condition of probation and
instead serve his or her sentence in prison."' As a result, the
105. E.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir.
1975) (finding that the only permissible conditions were those that contributed
both to the rehabilitation of the probationer and the protection of the public)
(quoting Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971)); People v. Mason,
488 P.2d 630, 632-33 (Cal. 1971) (holding that a condition of probation that
required a prior narcotics offender to submit to warrantless searches was valid
because it was aimed at deterring or discovering subsequent criminal offenses),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1971); see also United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d
1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991); State v. Gallagher, 675 P.2d 429, 431 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984); State v. Moore, 247 S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978).
106. 111 Cal. Rptr. 894, 895 (Ct. App. 1973).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See United States v. Shoenrock, 868 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding
probation condition that required probationer to submit to warrantless search if
he possessed drugs or alcohol); United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 525, 527 (9th
Cir. 1983) (upholding probation condition that required probationer to submit
to search at the reasonable request of any police officer); Mason, 488 P.2d at
632-33 (finding that a condition requiring a narcotics offender to submit to war-
rantless search at any time did not violate the Fourth Amendment), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); State v. Mitchell, 207 S.E.2d 263, 264-65 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1974) (upholding a probation condition which required probationer to sub-
mit to warrantless search at a reasonable time for illegal liquor).
110. See supra part II.A.4 for a brief discussion of the "consent" and "special
needs" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.
111. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 341 (Cal. 1987) (quoting In re Bushman,
463 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1970)), cert denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988). As discussed above,
juvenile probationers are required to accept probation conditions and therefore
do not have a voluntary choice. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 526 (Cal. 1994).
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California courts uphold these conditions pursuant to the
probationer's advance consent to the search. 112 Although
some jurisdictions find this consent coerced and therefore in-
valid,1 3 the California courts have found a probationer's con-
sent to a search condition "no less voluntary than the waiver
of rights by a defendant who pleads guilty to gain the benefits
of a plea bargain."1 14 Other jurisdictions justify these search
conditions as a "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment."-5
4. Differing Interpretations of Griffin
As indicated above, the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a Wisconsin regulation that allowed "reason-
able" searches of all persons who were placed on probation. 6
Pursuant to the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment, the Court in Griffin upheld the statute, in part
because the regulation only authorized searches that were
conducted with "reasonable cause."'" 7 As a result of the Grif-
fin decision resting solely on the "special needs" exception to
the Fourth Amendment, the Court did not address the issue
of the validity of probationers' consent."" In recent years,
however, some jurisdictions have read Griffin to require all
probation search conditions to be supported by reasonable
112. For constitutional requirements of voluntary consent, see supra discus-
sion accompanying notes 57-75. Some jurisdictions have found such consent
invalid on the grounds that probationers are unable to make a voluntary choice.
E.g., People v. Peterson, 233 N.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (finding
unconstitutional a "blanket search and seizure" condition); State v. Thomas,
575 P.2d 171, 171-72 (Or. Ct. App. 1978) (finding a probation condition invalid
which required a defendant to submit to warrantless searches and seizures).
These courts have found the threat of impending incarceration to be coercive.
Peterson, 233 N.W.2d at 254-55. For example, in People v. Peterson, a Michigan
Court of Appeals found the legal effect of a warrantless search condition to be
coerced and rendered it invalid. Id. at 255.
113. See supra note 112.
114. Bravo, 738 P.2d at 341, cert denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988). See also
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-65 (1978) (finding a defendant's con-
sent to waive his fundamental right to trial valid even though he plead guilty in
order to be guaranteed a more lenient sentence).
115. E.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). California recently up-
held the imposition of mandatory probation conditions for juveniles as a "spe-
cial needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 526-
27.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
118. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872-80.
cause, regardless of the language of the search condition, and
regardless of whether a probationer previously consented to
waive his Fourth Amendment rights.
119
Other jurisdictions have limited Griffin to its facts, find-
ing that the Court merely upheld one state's regulation re-
stricting probationer's rights pursuant to a specific statutory
scheme. As such, these jurisdictions have found that Griffin
does not apply to probation conditions imposed by the trial
court. 
1 2 0
a. Federal Courts' Interpretation
The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the First and Ninth dis-
tricts have determined that Griffin requires that all proba-
tion searches be based on a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal
activity, regardless of the specific language of the "search con-
dition."12' For example, in United States v. Giannetta,1 22 the
defendant-appellant, a probationer with a "search condition,"
objected to the search of his apartment by his probation of-
ficer pursuant to that condition.123 The "search condition" re-
quired the defendant to "readily submit to a search of his res-
idence and of any other premises under his domination and
control, by his supervising probation officer, upon the officer's
request."124 Giannetta, the defendant, argued that his proba-
tion officer needed probable cause to search his residence re-
gardless of his search condition. 125  The court disagreed and
upheld the search pursuant to the probation condition.
126
In reaching its conclusion, however, the court indicated
that the search was valid only because it was based on the
probation officer's reasonable suspicion of criminal activ-
119. See United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 575-76 (1st Cir. 1990)
(finding that Griffin limits all probation searches to reasonable cause). See also
United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 143-164.
121. Giannetta, 909 F.2d at 576.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 574. The defendant was placed on probation as part of a plea
bargain where he plead guilty to "conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
approximately two kilograms of cocaine and conspiracy to import approxi-
mately 8,000 pounds of hashish." Id. at 573.
124. United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 573 (1st Cir. 1990).
125. Id. at 575.
126. Id.
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ity.'2 7 The court interpreted this as a limitation set down by
Griffin: "the condition allows a search by a probation officer
with or without reasonable suspicion, which would appear to
conflict with the dictates of Griffin.' 28
In United States v. Davis,129 the Ninth Circuit also indi-
cated that Griffin requires that all probation searches be sup-
ported by "reasonable suspicion."130 The primary issue in
Davis was whether the scope of a probationer's search condi-
tion had been violated.1 3 1 Citing Giannetta, the court deter-
mined that the appropriate standard of review for a probation
search was one of reasonable cause: "[w]e therefore conclude
that police must have a reasonable suspicion ... to fall within
the permissible bounds of a probation search."132 The court
also indicated that this limit existed regardless of whether or
not a probationer consented to his or her search condition."3 3
In sum, the Davis and Giannetta courts held that the search
of a probationer must be supported by a reasonable cause
even if that probationer's search condition requires him to
submit to searches at any time for any reason.'
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however,
came to a different conclusion. In United States v.
Shoenrock,13 5 the defendant had been placed on probation for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.1 6 As a condition of proba-
tion, the defendant was required to submit to random
searches of his premises.1 3 7 After being placed on probation,
127. Id. at 576. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity has been equated
with reasonable cause.
128. Id.
129. 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991).
130. Id. at 758.
131. Id. at 758-59.
132. Id. at 758.
133. Id. The court found:
[W]e recognize that California draws a distinction between probation-
ers and parolees .... [a] probationer unlike a parolee, consents to the
waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights .... [However, wie do not
believe the distinction... is constitutionally significant .... We there-
fore conclude that the police must have a reasonable suspicion . . . to
fall within the permissible bounds of a probation search.
Id. Applying the reasonable suspicion standard, the court concluded that the
search did not exceed the scope of the probationer's search condition. Id. at 760.
134. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 1990).
135. 868 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1989).
136. Id. at 290.
137. Id.
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a warrantless search was conducted of the defendant's home
which revealed evidence of several probation violations. 8'
The officers who conducted the search relied on the probation
terms alone to justify the search.139  Citing Griffin, the de-
fendant argued that the search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. 140 The court found Griffin inapplicable and held that
the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 141 The
court held that Griffin stood for "the proposition that reasona-
bleness for probationary searches may be established by stat-
ute rather than by warrant."142
b. California's Interpretation
Two weeks after Griffin, the California Supreme Court
decided People v. Bravo.'4 3 The issue in Bravo was the con-
stitutionality of a warrantless search conducted pursuant to
a probation condition that required the probationer to
"[s]ubmit his person and property to search or seizure at any
time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer with
or without a warrant." 44 Relying on Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte, 45 the court held that since the search was con-
ducted pursuant to the probationer's voluntary consent, it
would only violate the Fourth Amendment if it exceeded the
scope of that consent.146 The court reasoned that a plain
reading of the search condition expressly waived "whatever
claim of privacy [the probationer] might have otherwise
had."1 47 As a limitation on its holding, the court stated that
probation searches could only be conducted for "legitimate
law enforcement purposes" which were not "undertaken for
harassment or ... arbitrary or capricious reasons. 1148 How-
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1989).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988).
144. Id. at 337 n.1.
145. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
146. Bravo, 738 P.2d. at 338-40.
147. Id. at 340 (quoting People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 634 (Cal. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972)). The court's only reference to the Griffin decision
was in a footnote which appeared to distinguish it as a case only having to do
with searches conducted pursuant to administrative regulations.
148. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904
(1988).
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ever, the court explicitly stated that probation searches con-
ducted pursuant to valid consent did not require a showing of
"reasonable cause," as was required by the federal courts in
Davis and Giannetta.149
Relying on Bravo, California courts have distinguished
Griffin as applying only to searches conducted pursuant to a
regulatory scheme. 150 For example, the California Supreme
Court found in In re Tyrell J. that "[t]he [United States
Supreme] court [sic] also suggested that its reasoning was
limited to searches based on a state regulation requiring rea-
sonable cause."15 Similarly, in In re Marcellus L.,152 the
Court of Appeal for the First District found that Griffin does
not apply when a defendant specifically agrees to submit to
warrantless searches: "[tihe authority to search [in Griffin]
existed by way of [Wisconsin's] regulation, not because the
defendant specifically agreed to submit to warrantless, unex-
pected searches."15 3 Therefore, California has found that
Griffin applies to a different exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant requirement, namely the "special needs"
exception.1 5 4
In addition to finding that Griffin does not read in a con-
stitutional "reasonable suspicion" limitation on all probation
search conditions, the California courts have held that a
searching officer need not know of a probationer's search con-
dition for a search to be valid.15 5 Instead, the courts focus on
the probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy. 156 In
Tyrell J., the probationer was required to submit to be
searched by "any" law enforcement officer. 15 7 The California
149. Id.
150. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 524 (Cal. 1994). See also In re Marcellus
L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 904 (Ct. App. 1991); cf In re Bihn L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678,
681 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding, contrary to Griffin, that once adult probationers
waive their Fourth Amendment rights, they can only object to searches done for
harassment purposes or for arbitrary or capricious reasons). Griffin is based on
the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. See Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873-75.
151. Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 524.
152. Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
153. Id. at 940.
154. Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 523.
155. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 525-26 (Cal. 1994); In re Bihn L., 6 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 678, 681 (Ct. App. 1992); In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 904
(Ct. App. 1991).
156. Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 521.
157. Id. See the fact pattern in part I which is based on the facts of Tyrell J.
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Supreme Court reasoned that because the probationer was
subject to a valid condition of probation which required that
he submit to "any" police officer, and not only those who had
knowledge of his search condition, that he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy. 158 The court held that a probationer's
reasonable expectation of privacy was not altered by the
searching officer's lack of knowledge of the probation
condition. 159
Two California Courts of Appeal had reached this conclu-
sion prior to the supreme court's holding in Tyrell J. In
Marcellus L., a police officer stopped a minor for truancy and
searched him for safety reasons. 160 The minor turned out to
be on probation, but the police officer had no knowledge of the
minor's probationary status.' 6 1 Conceding that "there were
no articulable facts to justify the pat search," the court up-
held the search because there was no harassment by the po-
lice officer and the search condition restricted the proba-
tioner's Fourth Amendment rights.' 62 The court indicated
that the search condition would pass constitutional muster
under both Bravo and Griffin: "[i]t goes without saying that a
search undertaken pursuant to [the probation] clause for
monitoring or other probation purposes would pass review
under Griffin and Bravo." 163 The court added: "[w]e do not
think the validity of [probationer's] search condition is depen-
dent upon the searching officer's knowledge of that
condition. 1 6 4
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The problem in determining the Fourth Amendment
rights of probationers is twofold. First, the degree to which a
probationer may waive his Fourth Amendment rights must
be resolved. The Court in Griffin reviewed a Wisconsin regu-
158. Id. at 530.
159. Id. See also Bihn L., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684; Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 903.
160. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 903 (Ct. App. 1991). The court
found that the "safety reasons" articulated by the officer were not sufficient to
justify the search. Id. As a result, but for the existence of the search condition,
the search would have been unlawful.
161. Id. at 902-03.
162. Id. at 903.
163. Id. at 904.
164. Id.
12551995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
lation that limited the rights of all probationers by statute.
16 5
The statute in Griffin applied regardless of the specific proba-
tion conditions to which probationers agreed.166 However,
the Courts of Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits have
read Griffin to imply a "reasonable suspicion" limitation on
all probation searches. 167 California, on the other hand, has
taken Griffin on its face and applied its holding only to situa-
tions where searches are conducted pursuant to an adminis-
trative regulation. 68 In doing so, the California courts have
held that these searches should only be limited by the scope
of probationers' search conditions.
69
The second hurdle arises when a police officer conducts a
search without knowledge of a probationer's search condition.
As discussed above, California courts have upheld these
searches on the basis of the language of the probationer's
search condition even though it would otherwise be illegal.'
70
California has found a police officer's knowledge irrelevant
when determining a probationer's reasonable expectation of
privacy. 1 7 No other jurisdiction has addressed this issue.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review for Probationary Searches
The conflict that Griffin created is understandable con-
sidering society's traditional reluctance to compromise funda-
mental constitutional rights. It is surprising, however, that
in jurisdictions where probationers must consent to probation
conditions, more courts have not addressed the issue of
whether a probationer's consent is not voluntary but coerced
under the test set down by Schneckloth. Relying on
Schneckloth, courts could easily find that the threat of incar-
ceration precludes a defendant from making a free and un-
constrained choice.' 72 After all, few prospects could be more
coercive than the threat of incarceration and all of the evils
that accompany life in prison. However, with a few excep-
165. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
166. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871 (1987).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 121-142.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 143-164.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 143-164.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 143-164.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 143-164.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 58-70 for a discussion of the Court's
holding in Schneckloth.
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tions, it has been held that it is not coercive for a probationer
to consent to submit to warrantless searches in exchange for
a reduced sentence. 173 As a result, because a probationer's
consent has been generally held valid, 174 and because the
United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that prior
consent is constitutional, 1 75 the issue of the validity of this
type of consent appears to have been resolved.
Instead of addressing the consent issue, some federal
courts have relied on Griffin to limit the scope of all probation
searches.'7 6 A close reading of Griffin, however, indicates
that this extension was not the intent of the Court. Griffin
clearly applies only to situations where probationers' rights
are universally circumscribed by statute. '. In Griffin, the
Court upheld the Wisconsin statute in part because it was
limited to searches conducted with reasonable cause. '7 The
Court was swayed by the reasonable cause limitation only be-
cause the statute was such a broad restriction on probation-
ers' Fourth Amendment rights.17 9  That is, the statute
applied to all probationers, without their consent, and re-
gardless of the crime they committed.'80
Furthermore, the Court explicitly found the Wisconsin
statute constitutional based on the "special needs" exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause re-
quirements.' 8 ' The Court refused to carve out any new prin-
cipal of law as some of the lower federal courts have done:
"w]e think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded
that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. To reach that result, however, we find it unnec-
essary to embrace a new principal of law, as the Wisconsin
court evidently did. .. ."182 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
173. See supra text accompanying notes 109-115.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 109-115.
175. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800
(1947) (per curiam).
176. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (1st Cir. 1990).
177. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 875.
180. Id. at 870.
181. Id. at 875-76 ("We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's
probation system make the warrant requirement impractical and justify re-
placement of the standard of probable cause by 'reasonable grounds'.....
182. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987).
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had held that, regardless of the statute, a search of any pro-
bationer need only be supported by reasonable cause.' 83 The
United States Supreme Court expressly disagreed, stating
that its holding was based on the fact that there was a
statute:
The search of Griffin's residence was "reasonable"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it
was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing
probationers. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to
consider whether, as the court below held and the State
urges, any search of a probationer's home by a probation
officer is lawful when there are "reasonable grounds"
184
The attempt by the Courts of Appeals for the First and
Ninth District to extend Griffin beyond its limited holding is
clearly erroneous. These courts have tried to apply Griffin
beyond its facts. They have ignored the fact that the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court and the State urged the Court to extend
the Griffin holding beyond the statute provided.18 5 The Court
expressly refused.1
8 6
In sum, the First and Ninth Circuits have incorrectly
tried to expand the Griffin holding in two ways. First, by ar-
guing that the Court, in finding the Wisconsin regulation con-
stitutional, created a new "reasonable suspicion" limitation
on all probation searches. 187 Second, by attempting to use
this holding (which was clearly based on the "special needs"
exception) to limit probation searches that are conducted pur-
suant to the probationer's voluntary consent.1
88
The correct view has been adopted by the Eight Circuit
Court of Appeals, California Supreme Court, and California
Courts of Appeal. 189 These courts reason that a search con-
ducted pursuant to a probation condition is only limited by
the scope of that condition. 190 This rationale is even more
183. Id.
184. Id. at 880.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (1st. Cir. 1990).
188. Davis, 932 F.2d at 758.
189. United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1989); In re
Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 525-26 (Cal. 1994); People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 337
n.1 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 904 (1988).
190. Tyrell J., 876 P.2d at 525-26.
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persuasive in jurisdictions such as California where adult
probationers must consent to their search conditions in order
for the conditions to be valid. Ruling otherwise would give
probationers special protection by limiting their ability to
consent even though courts have held one can voluntarily
consent to waive their Fourth Amendment rights.191
Furthermore, the Griffin decision indicates that the
Fourth Amendment rights of probationers should be nar-
rower, and not broader, than the rights guaranteed to other
citizens. Griffin upheld a statute which restricts the Fourth
Amendment rights of all probationers. 192 The statute even
includes those who have not voluntarily consented to waive
their rights. 193 In addition, it applies regardless of the crime
the probationer committed.194 Therefore, Griffin stands for
the proposition that probationers may be afforded less Fourth
Amendment protection than other citizens. Reaching the op-
posite conclusion, the Courts of Appeal for the First and
Ninth Circuits have mistakenly provided probationers with
more.
B. Relevance of the Government Agent's Knowledge
The second issue in this analysis is to determine whether
a police officer's knowledge is necessary for a search to be
valid where such knowledge is not required by a probationer's
search condition. This issue arises in situations where it is
clear that, but for the existence of the probationer's search
condition, the search would violate the Fourth Amendment.
The California courts have found that when a search is con-
ducted pursuant to a valid search condition which requires a
probationer to submit to be searched by "any" police officer,
the searching officer's knowledge of that condition is
irrelevant. 195
1. Legal Considerations
First, the permissible scope of the search must be deter-
mined. That is, what a reasonable person would understand
191. See United States v. Varona-Algos, 819 F.2d 81, 83 (5th Cir. 1987) (indi-
cating that the only limit on consent is coercive tactics by government officials),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987).
192. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870-71 (1987).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 529-30 (Cal. 1994).
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the scope to be, from the language of the condition itself,
must be determined.196 If a reasonable person would under-
stand the language of a probationer's search condition to in-
clude a police officer who had no knowledge of the search con-
dition, then the controlling authority indicates that the
search is valid. For example, the defendant in In re Bihn
L. 197 was a probationer whose search condition required that
he submit to be searched by "any peace officer or school offi-
cial."198 Understandably, the court determined that the rea-
sonable person would understand the phrase "any police of-
ficer" to encompass all police officers, whether or not they had
knowledge of the defendant's search condition.199
The second reason for supporting these decisions is the
long-standing notion that the validity of a search has always
been an evaluation of objective facts which could not be al-
tered by an officer's state of mind. For example, in Anderson
v. Creighton,2 °° the United States Supreme Court held that
probable cause to sustain a search could not be established by
showing that a searching officer subjectively believed he had
grounds for his action.2 10 Similarly, in determining if a
"plain view" search is valid, courts consider whether the de-
fendant has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy.2 °2
This is demonstrated by objective facts such as where the
property is located and from where it is seen.20 3 The search-
ing officer's state of mind is irrelevant to making this
determination.20 4
Since an officer's state of mind has never before been rel-
evant to Fourth Amendment searches, it should not now be-
come a relevant factor.20 5 If an unconstitutional search can-
not be justified by a police officer's state of mind, the state of
mind of the police officer should not subject the fruits of a
constitutional search to the exclusionary rule.
196. See supra notes 71-75.
197. 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Ct. App. 1992).
198. Id. at 679.
199. Id. at 681.
200. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
201. Id. at 638-41; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
202. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
203. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
204. Id.
205. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 906 (Ct. App. 1991).
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2. Policy Considerations
In addition to the legal justifications, there are several
policy considerations that support allowing probation
searches. First, limiting the scope of these searches would
hinder the use of probation as an alternative to incarceration.
Public policy demands that any restriction on the use of pro-
bation should be discouraged. Probation is a healthy attempt
to rehabilitate rather than punish criminals. Unlike incar-
ceration, it gives criminals a second chance to demonstrate
that they can contribute positively to society. The alternative
would be confinement where these convicted criminals would
suffer even more severe restrictions on their freedom. Many
of the benefits of this rehabilitative approach to punishment
would be lost.
The benefits of expanding the use of probation are many.
Probation is currently a useful incentive for criminals to coop-
erate with law enforcement officials thereby increasing the
government's ability to counter crime.2 °6 In addition, courts
have always had broad discretion when granting proba-
tion.2 °7 This has allowed judges who are familiar with a par-
ticular case to apply probation conditions which they feel are
best suited to a particular defendant. Judicial discretion has
resulted in a more creative, flexible approach to managing
the crime problems in the United States.20 8 Any restriction
on this flexible approach should be discouraged.
A second important justification is the public safety con-
siderations of probation. When granting probation, judges
are required to factor in the public safety considerations of
allowing convicted criminals out on the street.2 °9 If the con-
dition exception applied only to the limited number of police
officers who have knowledge of a probationer's search condi-
tion, the condition would be less of an incentive to act law-
fully. Under this line of reasoning, the increased threat to
public safety may also cause probation to be used less fre-
206. See, e.g., United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 573 (1st Cir. 1990)
(granting probation in lieu of a sentence to state prison due to the defendant's
extensive cooperation with law enforcement authorities in a drug trafficking
investigation).
207. See supra notes 96-103.
208. E.g., United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (ap-
proving a urinalysis and drug screening condition).
209. Cf. People v. Kay, 111 Cal. Rptr. 894, 895 (Ct. App. 1973).
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quently, leaving sentencing judges with only incarceration as
an option.
Third, limiting the scope of probationers' search condi-
tions would circumscribe the use of a valid means of reducing
recidivism. Convicted criminals who are put on probation are
less likely to violate the law again if they know that they may
be searched by law enforcement officials at any time.210 For
example, the California Supreme Court found in People v.
Bravo,211 that a narcotics offender "[w]ith knowledge he may
be subject to a search by law enforcement officers at any time
... will be less inclined to have narcotics or dangerous drugs
in his possession."212 The deterrent effect will be increased
by a search condition that allows probationers to be searched
by any police officer and not only the few who happen to have
knowledge of the probationer's search condition.
In addition, the purpose of an unexpected search is not
only to ascertain whether a probationer is disobeying the law,
but whether he is obeying the law as well.21 3 Information ob-
tained from these searches is a valuable measure of whether
the rehabilitative purposes of probation are having an ef-
fect.21 4 If probationers are limited to being searched by the
relatively few officers who have knowledge of the search con-
dition, then the search condition will have an extremely lim-
ited effect. The fact that probationers have advance notice
that they will be subject to ardent monitoring by all police
officers will decrease the likelihood of future criminality.
This is precisely the purpose the probation system has been
designed to serve.21 5
3. Effect on Police Harassment
Critics of the California decisions have several con-
cerns. 2 6 First, some argue that allowing the introduction of
210. People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 342 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
904 (1988); People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 632 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1016 (1972).
211. 738 P.2d 336 (Cal. 1987).
212. Id. at 342.
213. Id.
214. In re Bushman, 463 P.2d 727, 732-33 (Cal. 1970) (finding that courts
have broad discretion to impose probation conditions which foster rehabilitation
and protect public safety).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 96-103.
216. See generally In re Tyrell J., 21 Cal. App. 4th 1243, 1255 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a searching officer's knowledge of a probationer's search condition
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evidence from these searches will reward unlawful police be-
havior and therefore encourage this undesirable activity in
the future.217 This argument fails on several grounds. First,
it assumes that the rule creates an incentive for police officers
to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens. The
logic underlying this assumption dictates that police officers
would begin to randomly and unconstitutionally search un-
suspecting citizens. The purpose, the theory goes, is the hope
that they will have the fortuity of coming across an unsus-
pecting probationer who happens to have a probation condi-
tion requiring him to submit to warrantless searches. The
chances of coming across a probationer with such a search
condition, the fact that any incriminating evidence found on
the non-probationers will be suppressed, and the conse-
quences of being convicted of police harassment make the
likelihood of such behavior doubtful.
Second, this proposition disregards the limitation that
the California courts have placed on these searches. As dis-
cussed above, all evidence which is the product of searches
that are conducted for arbitrary, capricious, or harassment
purposes will be subject to the exclusionary rule-the same
remedy afforded all other unconstitutional searches.2 18
Therefore, there will be no new rewards for police officers to
act in an unconstitutional manner. The evidence of these
searches will only be admitted when they are acting in good
faith.
Third, the proposition assumes that police officers will
act in bad faith. However, there have been no charges of har-
assment or bad faith in the California cases that have evalu-
ated these searches. For instance, in Marcellus L., a police
officer stopped a minor for truancy which the trial and appel-
late courts found reasonable. 219 The minor was found in
front of a known crack house which was located in area
known for dealing drugs.220 For safety reasons, the police of-
is required under the Fourth Amendment), overruled by 876 P.2d 519 (Cal.
1994); In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 908-10 (Ct. App. 1991) (Rear-
don, J., dissenting) (arguing that a searching officer's knowledge of a proba-
tioner's search condition is required under Bravo).
217. Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95 for a brief discussion of the
exclusionary rule.
219. Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 903 n.2.
220. Id. at 902.
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ficer conducted a brief pat search to look for weapons.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that a truancy stop
did not justify a pat down search for weapons.222 The court
found, however, that the police officer had a legitimate reason
to detain the defendant.223 In addition, the defendant made
no claim that the officer was acting for arbitrary, capricious,
or harassment purposes.224
Similarly, in Tyrell J., a police officer was patrolling a
high school football game because of a shooting that had oc-
curred the previous week.225 The defendant and his friends
drew the suspicion of the police officer because they had been
identified as members of the gang involved in the previous
shooting and because they were wearing heavy bulky coats on
a hot summer night.226 A search of the group produced mari-
juana and a long fixed blade knife.227 The court found the
facts would have been insufficient to support the search had
the defendant not been subject to the probation condition.228
These cases illustrate that the situations where this rule
is being applied are not those where police officers are harass-
ing citizens at random. The rule only applies when police of-
ficers have arrived at incorrect legal conclusions as to the fac-
tual basis required to justify a temporary seizure. As
discussed above, these legal determinations are very fact spe-
cific. 2 2 9 Courts must engage in very imprecise considerations
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding each
search.23 ° Police officers cannot be expected to apply the cor-
rect legal analysis to every situation in the field. In addition,
nowhere has it been contended that police activity which is
arbitrary, capricious or for harassment purposes may be jus-
tified by a probationer's search clause.
The fourth reason that allowing this evidence will not
contribute to illegal police activity is the safeguards which al-
ready exist. Evidence from searches that are the product of
221. In re Marcellus L., 279 Cal. Rptr. 901, 903 (Ct. App. 1991).
222. Id. at 903 n.2.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 904.
225. In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d 519, 521-22 (Cal. 1994).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
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arbitrary police behavior will not be admissible.23 1 In addi-
tion, victims of police harassment will still have the legal
remedies of bringing suit for police harassment and civil
rights violations.
4. Balancing Considerations Warrant Invasion of
Constitutional Rights
The public policy considerations warrant this limitation
of a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights.23 2 As discussed
above, Schneckloth stands for the proposition that the right
to be free from unwarranted searches and seizures is not sub-
ject to the same strict scrutiny as other constitutional protec-
tions.233 On balance, public policy concerns underlying the
need for probation outweigh the cost of less limited searches
and seizures. Encouraging rehabilitation, discouraging recid-
ivism and protecting the public from future criminal activity
all justify a more intense monitoring of probationers who
have voluntarily waived their Fourth Amendment rights.
Further, a limit for this broad probation condition is al-
ready in place.23 4 Courts must adhere to the rule that a pro-
bation condition must reasonably relate to the prevention of
future criminal activity.235 As the cases have illustrated, this
limitation prevents the abuse of overly broad probation condi-
tions.23 6 Therefore, a condition requiring probationers to
submit to warrantless searches will only be used in the cir-
cumstances where it relates to preventing future violations of
the law.
V. PROPOSAL
The United States Supreme Court must revisit Griffin to
clarify the ambiguity created by the First and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal. In so doing, the Court should be guided by
the following three principles. 237 First, the federal courts of
appeals' holdings which require that all probation searches
be supported by reasonable cause238 should be expressly re-
231. See supra text accompanying note 148.
232. See discussion supra part IV.B.2.
233. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
234. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
235. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
236. See discussion supra part II.B.4.a.
237. See discussion supra part II.B.4.a.
238. See discussion supra part II.B.4.a.
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jected. Such an exception to the test for consent has never
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court and
goes against the dictates of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.239 In
addition, Griffin provides no authority for this exception be-
cause such a finding goes beyond the scope of its holding.
Second, the limit of a probation search should be deter-
mined by the language of the search condition. In addition,
courts should find in all search conditions an implicit refusal
to consent to any police behavior which is arbitrary, capri-
cious, harassing or conducted in bad faith. This limitation is
simply a recognition that no reasonable person should con-
sent to this sort of government action.
Finally, the court should find that a searching officer's
knowledge of a search condition is irrelevant when determin-
ing the validity of a search. The scope of a search should be
determined by the language of the search condition alone.
The Supreme Court does not consider relevant the searching
officer's subjective belief that he has grounds for his action.24 °
Probable cause and its exceptions have always been deter-
mined by objective facts which are considered in light of all
the circumstances.241 Public policy considerations demon-
strate there is no reason to deviate from this general rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court must revisit Griffin in
order to clarify the scope of its holding. Conflicting interpre-
tations of Griffin make unclear the validity and scope of pro-
bationary search conditions and a probationer's ability to con-
sent to waive her Fourth Amendment rights. In California,
the same search condition provides a defendant with different
Fourth Amendment protections depending on whether she is
sitting in state or federal court. This arbitrary application of
what should be settled Fourth Amendment principals de-
mands the United States Supreme Court's consideration.
The California Supreme Court has taken the first step in
resolving these issues in Tyrell J. Hopefully, the Tyrell J. de-
cision will draw the United States Supreme Court's attention
to the current conflicting applications of Griffin in the lower
courts' decisions. This comment's proposal provides a clear
239. See supra text accompanying notes 172-193.
240. See supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
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and simple resolution to the conflicting interpretations that
currently exist. Applying existing Fourth Amendment prece-
dent is preferred because it unambiguously puts probationers
on notice of their Fourth Amendment rights. The federal
courts of appeals' holdings are an ad hoc effort to provide pro-
bationers with more Fourth Amendment protection than the
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provides.
The appropriate legal analysis and the public policy concerns
discussed above require that these rulings be abandoned.
Sean M. Kneafsey

